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This paper examines how trade liberalization affects the growth rate of employment in 
developed and developing countries.  The estimation results imply that trade openness in the 
form of higher trade volumes has not been successful in generating jobs in developing 
countries. The overall weak, negative employment response to trade volumes may be 
explained by the negative output response to trade openness in these countries. Our estimates 
also indicate that higher trade volumes have adverse effect on industrial and agricultural 
employment in developed countries.  Moreover, trade barriers have relatively little adverse 
effect and/or in some cases positive effect on employment both in developing and developed 
countries.  Thus, it is probably safe to conclude that both higher (or lower) output and 
employment growth rates can stem from trade and industrial policies implemented by these 
countries.   3
1. Introduction 
The process of trade liberalization has accelerated since the late 1970s due to the 
removal of natural as well as artificial trade barriers.  Both developed and developing 
countries fear that openness to trade may cause substantial job losses.  In the developing 
countries, the primary focus of concern is on employment in import competing sectors, 
whereas in the developed countries, the concern is that increased trade with developing 
countries supposedly results in adverse labor market outcomes for less-skilled workers.  A 
common concern is that ‘cheap labor’ and the ‘race to bottom’ may be the consequence of 
increasing levels of integration.  Thus, there have always been protectionist sentiments against 
liberalization in both developed and developing countries. 
During the past two decades, general reductions in the aggregate demand for labor has 
accompanied the expansion of international trade (ILO, 1995).  On average, the 
unemployment rate has been growing across countries.  According to the Global Employment 
Report 2004, global employment conditions deteriorated and total unemployment in the world 
economy grew slightly in 2003 despite an increase in growth of real GDP and of trade after 
two years of sluggish economic performance. The number of unemployed in the world has 
reached the highest level ever recorded. In parallel to the worsening employment situation, the 
size of the informal economy increased in the developing regions characterized by low GDP 
growth rates (ILO, 2004a). 
While the wage and employment conditions of unskilled labor in many industrial 
countries have worsened during the last two decades, we have seen opposite tendencies in 
some groups of developing countries.  Asian economies have experienced both rising 
employment and falling wage inequality, while in Latin American countries, employment 
growth has been slow and inequalities have been increasing.  Most of the earlier studies of the 
impact of trade openness on labor market outcomes focused on developed countries, but 
recently, there has been an increase in case studies  examining the effects of trade openness on 
the labor markets of developing countries (Ghose 2000).  
This paper examines the effects of trade openness on labor market measures. It 
analyzes the issue of trade openness and employment in agriculture, industry, and services 
from a consistent cross-country perspective.  Our estimation results imply that trade openness 
in the form of higher trade volumes or lower trade barriers has not been successful in 
generating jobs in developing countries.  Similarly, they also show that trade openness or 
trading more with developing countries does not seem to reduce overall employment in 
developed countries.  Overall, our results thus indicate that developing countries have not   4
been able to benefit from trade liberalization.  Therefore, trade openness is not in itself a 
solution to the unemployment problems of developing countries 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the relationship between trade 
openness and employment in developed and developing countries. Section 3 discusses the 
data and empirical methodology.  In Section 4, we report the results for the relationship 
between changes in employment in agriculture, industry and services and trade openness, 
followed by a discussion section.  Finally, Section 6 draws conclusions from the empirical 
investigation.   
2. Literature  Review 
The main theoretical framework guiding research on the employment effects of trade 
liberalization in developing countries is the “specific factors” trade model. This model makes 
the following short-run assumptions: capital-specificity, labor mobility between sectors and 
inelastic aggregate factor supply. Dismantling trade barriers will cause labor shifts from the 
shrinking import-competing sectors to the expanding export-oriented sectors. Since the labor 
intensity of export industries is expected to be higher than that of import-competing sectors in 
developing countries, overall, trade liberalization should bring about an increase in aggregate 
labor demand. However, by emphasizing the importance of the nontraded goods sectors, 
surplus labor and dualism in the labor markets in developing countries, Ghose (2000, p. 6) 
argued that “North-South trade in manufactures would have the predicted unfavorable effects 
on employment and wages of unskilled workers in North but could conceivably fail to 
generate the predicted beneficial effects in South.” 
Exposure to increased foreign competition may not only cause a shift in labor towards 
exportable sectors but may also result in better resource allocation and increased efficiency.  
But if alternative trade policies promote capital deepening in all industries through implicit 
subsidization of capital goods imports, then employment will grow slowly as industries use 
relatively more capital-intensive production techniques.  Alternative theoretical perspectives 
have been developed by Wood (1994 and 1997) and Rodrik (1997)
1, arguing that trade may 
have adverse effects on the employment of unskilled workers by bringing about technological 
change that leads to a displacement of unskilled workers and/or by increasing the own-price 
employment elasticity of unskilled workers, and thus, making these workers more vulnerable 
to economic shocks. Therefore, the net effects of trade liberalization on employment will 
depend on these offsetting effects, an outcome that cannot be determined theoretically.  
                                                 
1 Rama (2003) and Sen (2003) briefly reviewed the empirical literature assessing Rodrik’s argument.   5
In both developed and developing countries there has been growing concern about 
rising unemployment and about the living standards of the poor.  Protection has been 
advocated to boost employment, especially in industrialized countries, particularly the UK 
and the US.  Although the mainstream macroeconomics literature suggests that import 
controls are likely to be contractionary for an economy with a flexible exchange rates 
(Mundell 1961), Cripps and Godley (1976, 1978) challenge this view and argue that 
compared to ‘deflation’ and ’devaluation’ options, control of imports is a better policy option 
for maintaining full employment (see also Fender and Yip 1989 and Ocampo 1987, 1990 on 
the macroeconomic effect of import controls from a Keynesian perspective).  Interestingly, 
Slaughter (1999, p. 610), bases on a few broad observations, argues that a protectionist 
backlash “ is already under way – particularly with respect to controlling the terms of trade 
policy debate in the United States and other countries.”  
During the last three decades, major trade liberalization reforms have been undertaken 
by developing countries unilaterally and/or as a condition of IMF and World Bank loans.  
Numerous case studies that have examined the effect of trade reforms on employment for 
developing countries have shown a substantial dispersion of the net effect on employment.  
Papageorgiou et al. (1990) concludes that trade liberalization in developing countries did not 
cause losses in employment even in the short run. Currie and Harrison (1997) find that trade 
reform had essentially no effect on employment for the majority of firms, except for publicly 
owned firms and export oriented firms in Morocco. Revenga (1997) finds that while changes 
in tariffs had no impact on Mexican manufacturing employment, reductions in quotas had 
significant but small negative effects on employment. Harrison and Hanson (1999) report that 
employment changes are only weakly associated with changes in trade policies in Morocco 
and Mexico.   
Milner and Wright (1998) find higher employment in both the exportable and 
importable sectors following the trade liberalization initiated in Mauritius. Similar positive 
employment effects in import-competing industries following trade liberalization are reported 
in Ghose (2000) for a number of high-growth Asian countries. Parker et al. (1995) report that 
trade liberalization increased the employment levels of small firms in a number of African 
countries. Harrison and Revenga (1995) find that while trade liberalization boosted 
employment in Latin countries (Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay), it led to substantial 
employment losses in transition economies (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania).  
Rama (1994) concludes that trade liberalization substantially reduced manufacturing 
employment in Uruguay, especially when trade union activities were banned. Moreira and   6
Najberg (2000) report that trade liberalization in the 1990s lowered manufacturing 
employment in the Brazil. Winters (2000) finds an adverse impact on employment from trade 
liberalization in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and India. Levinsohn (1999) concludes that in Chile, 
following a trade reform, net employment in manufacturing fell by about 8 percent, and over 
an eight-year period about a quarter of all workers changed jobs.  
While the pace of trade liberalization in industrialized countries has slowed during the 
past three decades, the employment (and wage) conditions of unskilled labor in many 
industrialized countries have worsened substantially
2. The ILO (2004b) reports that in most 
developed countries the ratio of the 10 percent highest paid over the 10 percent lowest paid 
workers between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s has increased considerably.  For the US 
and the UK, this ratio is over 30 percent.  Despite their relatively low levels, imports from 
developing countries are usually considered to be the prime cause of the increasing skill 
premium and lower demand for unskilled labor.  For example, trade data from IMF’s 
Direction of Trade Statistics show that developing countries have been responsible for a third 
of the total US imports over the past three decades. 
The employment effects of trade liberalization in developing countries contrasts with 
those obtained found in similar studies for the industrialized countries.  Following trade 
liberalization in industrialized countries, job losses are found to be quite substantial (Revenga 
1992; Gaston and Trefler 1997; Hakura 1997; Beaulieu 2000; Trefler 2001; Scott 2001; 
Tomiura 2003; Lang 1998).  Several studies (Baldwin 1995; Ghose 2000; Heitger and Stehn 
2003) looking at the effects of developing country exports on labor market outcomes in the 
industrialized countries, conclude that they have relatively little adverse effect on 
manufacturing employment in industrialized economies.  Surprisingly, Greenaway et al. 
(1999) find that increased trade volumes, especially from the EU and the US, led to reductions 
in the level of employment in the UK.  Overall, for the industrialized countries, it appears that 
trade liberalization results in employment losses. 
Turrini (2002) claims that while empirical studies of the labor market impact of trade 
in developing countries adopts a short-run perspective such as the fixed-factor model of 
                                                 
2 There are two strands of literature that offer explanations for the falling demand for unskilled labor in 
developed countries.  The first line of research suggests that skill-biased technological change has reduced the 
demand for unskilled labor (Krugman 2000). The other line of research emphasizes trade-related developments 
that affect the demand for different types of labor (Wood 1994; Leamer 2000).  Some authors (Slaughter 1998 
and 1999; Krugman 1995; Sachs and Shatz 1994) have argued that increased trade with developing countries 
cannot account for all of the adverse labor market outcomes in industrialized nations.  Ghose (2000) claimed that 
trade among industrialized countries could plausibly be blamed for this phenomenon.  A large number of studies 
using a variety of techniques for different countries have attempted to assess the relative importance of 
technology and trade as alternative explanations for the reduction in the demand for unskilled labor.   7
international trade, those for developed countries use the long-run framework of the 
neoclassical model of comparative advantage.  By showing different labor demand effects 
depending on the sector bias of trade liberalization reforms, he claims that there is a need to 
shift from a single-country to a cross-country perspective. In this study, we thus investigate 
the sectoral employment effects of trade openness using cross-country econometrics.  For this 
purpose, this analysis uses a large number of measures of trade volumes and trade barriers.  
3.  Model and Data 
To analyze the relationship between trade openness and sectoral employment growth, 
we estimate a simple model relating the employment growth rates to various trade openness 
measures.  The basic estimated model is: 
Δ log (EMPi) = Δ log (LABPRODi) + Δ log (POPi) + log (GDPi) + log (DENSITYi)  
                        + Δ log (INVi)+ OPENi + ε    
Sectoral employment (GEMP) growth rates -- industrial employment growth 
(GEMPIND), agricultural employment growth (GEMPAGR), and services employment 
growth (GEMPSER) --are calculated using the log differences of yearly total employment 
figures for each sector. Growth of output per worker (LABPROD) in each sector is used as a 
proxy for labor productivity. These growth rates are calculated in the same way as the 
employment growth rates.  While growth of agricultural machinery, tractors per 100 hectares 
of arable land (INV), is used to measure the capital stock related to the agricultural sector, 
growth of gross domestic fixed investment (INV) is used for the other two sectors. Data for 
these last four measures, (urban and rural) population growth rates (POP), population 
densities (DENSITY), and GDP at constant US dollars are from the World Bank (2004). 
Trade openness measures used in the paper are discussed below. ε is a disturbance term. 
We use two types of trade openness measures to investigate the employment effects of 
trade liberalization.  Unless indicated otherwise, annual data for all openness measures are 
taken from the World Bank (2004).  The first group of openness measures is calculated using 
trade volumes.  The most basic measure of trade intensity is “trade openness” (OPEN), which 
is the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP.  It has been known that earlier empirical studies 
on the growth effects of international trade put too much emphasize on (the growth of) 
exports and largely ignored the import sectors and their growth effects.  Therefore, this paper 
employs both import penetration ratios (MGDP) and exports shares in GDP (XGDP) to 
measure the extent of trade liberalization in a country.  We expect that both exports and 
imports are more likely to have different employment growth effects in different types of 
countries.    8
One of the mechanisms by which international trade fosters economic growth is that 
trade enables countries, especially developing countries, to acquire new goods and 
technologies invented in the developed countries.  We then expect that developing countries 
may benefit more from trading with technologically innovative developed countries than by 
trade with non-innovating developing countries.  Moreover, international trade theory 
suggests that trade flows from developed and developing have different employment 
implications in countries.  Thus, to assess whether the effects of trade with developed and 
with developing countries are different from one another, two more trade intensity ratios -- 
trade with OECD countries (TOECD) and trade with non-OECD countries (TNOECD) -- are 
also used in the empirical estimates.  The last two measures are taken from Easterly and 
Sewadeh (2002).  Further, given the fact that that the United States is one of the most highly 
innovative countries in the world, it may be more appropriate to test this hypothesis using 
U.S. bilateral trade data.  We then make use of the so-called “U.S. trade openness” measure 
(USBTRD), which is defined as the ratio of each country’s total bilateral trade with the U.S. 
to its GDP.  Note that bilateral trade numbers are weighted by the capital to capital distance to 
control for the impact of geographical proximity on bilateral trade.   
We further disaggregate trade volumes into five different groups.  The first group 
consists of merchandise trade (MERTRD), measured as the trade in goods as a share of GDP. 
Defined and calculated in the same way as MERTRD, merchandise exports (MEREXP) and 
merchandise imports (MERIMP) are also used in the estimates. The second group includes 
manufactured exports (MANEXP) and manufactured imports (MANIMP). The third group 
includes commodity exports (CMDEXP) and commodity imports (CMDIMP).  The fourth 
group consists of only agricultural raw material and food exports (AGREXP), and agricultural 
raw material and food imports (AGRIMP). Finally, the last group contains services exports 
(SERVEXP) and services imports (SERVIMP). We use the sectoral composition of exports 
and imports to see whether they exert different effects on employment growth. 
The other group of trade measures is based upon trade restrictions.  First, we use total 
import duties as a percentage of the value of imports (TARIFF) to measure the severity of 
trade restrictions. Second, we use total export duties as a percentage of the value of exports 
(XTAX) and taxes on international trade as a percentage of total national government revenue 
(TAXTRD) as measures of trade policies. Third, bilateral payments arrangements (BPAs) of 
IMF members with non-IMF members and current account restrictions (CURRENT) are used 
to measure the trade restrictiveness of countries.  Tabular data for BPA and CURRENT are 
taken from the IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Restrictions (ARER).  Summary statistics   9
for the main variables used are reported in Appendix A.  Data sources and definitions are 
listed in Appendix B. 
Cross-country regressions are estimated for a panel of about one hundred developed 
and developing countries for the sample period 1980 to 1999
3.  The number of countries is 
actually limited by the availability of data.  The system is a two-equation system estimated 
using the seemingly unrelated regression technique (SUR) as in Barro (1997)
4.  As Barro and 
Lee (2005) argue, panel estimates are preferred to fixed effect and first-differenced GMM 
estimates, because the latter techniques eliminate time-persistent cross-section information
5.  
4. Results 
4.1  Correlation between openness measures and employment growth 
Table 1 reports correlations between sectoral employment growth rates and various 
measures of openness.  The results show that while employment growth rates are positively 
correlated with trade barrier measures, they are in most cases negatively and significantly 
correlated with measures of trade volumes, excepting commodity exports.  While industrial 
employment positively correlates with employment in services, employment in agriculture 
correlates negatively with employment in the other two sectors.  The results also indicate that 
there is generally a statistically significant correlation among openness measures.  While most 
of the correlation coefficients have the expected signs, commodity trade usually has positive 
relationship with trade barrier measures. It seems that trade barriers are fairly effective for 
reducing manufacturing trade and increasing commodity trade.  
4.2  Trade openness and employment growth 
Figures 1 and 2 display the simple relationship between sectoral employment growth 
and trade shares and tariff rates for all countries. Figure 1 indicates that there exists a negative 
association between trade shares and the growth of sectoral employment.  As expected, this 
negative association is more noticeable for agricultural employment growth than for industrial 
or services employment. It is important to note that close investigation of the graphs reveals 
that the relationships between trade openness and employment growth are not driven by 
outliers. 
Figure 2 presents these relationships for import tariffs. Sectoral employment growth 
increases with tariff rates.  If the similar six graphs in Figures 1 and 2 are drawn only for 
developing nations (not shown), the relationship between agricultural employment and tariff 
                                                 
3 Countries used in estimates are listed in Appendix C. 
4 See Greene (1997) for a detailed discussion of this technique. 
5 Fixed-effect estimates also obtain very large convergence coefficients.   10
rates becomes negative.  The other five graphs for only developing nations depict 
considerably similar patterns.  The positive relationship between tariffs and employment 
growth is consistent with the findings of a wide array of studies. For example, while 
obviously contradicting the notion of import substituting strategies widely employed in the 
developing countries, Revenga (1997) finds that labor-intensive industries received more 
protection than capital-intensive sectors in Mexico.  Currie and Harrison (1997) report a 
similar pattern for Morocco (see also, Rama 2003; Harrison and Hanson 1999).  Moreover, 
several studies of developed countries (see Sachs and Shatz 1994 for the US; Beaulieu 2000 
for Canada; and Lang 1998 for New Zealand) report that more protection has been provided 
to the less-skill intensive sectors in developed countries as well.   
The estimates of the employment growth model are reported in Tables 2 -7.  The 
model is estimated as a two-equation panel using the seemingly unrelated regression 
technique.  Other than the constant terms, all coefficients are constrained to have the same 
value in each equation.  Regression results for industrial employment in Table 2 indicate that 
the growth of labor productivity measured by output per worker is significantly and 
negatively related to industrial employment growth, while urban population growth has 
significant positive effects.  The level of GDP has a negative coefficient, but is insignificant.  
Population densities and growth of gross domestic fixed investment are not significant.  Since 
the area-specific dummies for three areas (Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and East Asia) 
are insignificant in the base regressions, they are not included in further regressions.  
Regression results for the above-mentioned variables in the services employment regressions 
are similar to the industrial employment regressions. The only difference is that the level of 
GDP is significantly positive for services employment growth (see, Table 3).  
In the agricultural employment growth model in Table 4, labor productivity and 
population densities have significant, negative coefficients, while rural population growth has 
a positive effect on agricultural employment growth.  The level of GDP and investment 
measured by the growth of agricultural machinery in agriculture have insignificantly negative 
coefficients.  
4.2.1  Trade openness and employment in industry 
Table 5 reports the SUR estimates for decade averages of industrial employment 
growth
6. Both current and lagged values of trade shares (as well as exports and imports) have 
negative coefficients for the whole sample.  However, only those for lagged values are 
                                                 
6 Estimates of these models for four ‘five-year’ intervals obtain similar results, available from the author.   11
statistically significant. The estimated results indicate that higher trade shares are associated 
with lower industrial employment growth. Both developing and developed countries that trade 
more with OECD countries have higher industrial employment growth. While merchandise 
trade has a depressing effect on employment growth, driven by merchandise imports, 
manufacturing exports do have negative effects on employment growth through their effect on 
developing countries’ manufactured exports. Although regressions using five-year averages 
(not reported) have a similar pattern to the decade averages, one difference is that the five-
year estimates indicate that manufacturing exports boost industrial employment growth in 
developed countries.   
There are several feasible explanations for the negative employment effects of trade 
volumes.  If the traded goods are relatively capital-intensive compared to non-traded goods or 
trade liberalization leads to growth of capital intensity in the industrial sector, then higher 
trade shares may lead to a reduction in employment levels.  Moreover, if most of the exports 
of manufactured goods originating in developing countries are produced by branches and 
subsidiaries of MNCs that use the capital-intensive technology of the home country, there will 
be a reduction in the demand for labor.  The statistically significant, negative coefficients for 
the manufacturing exports of developing countries support this argument.  
Higher trade shares may also reduce employment by reducing the demand for 
abundant, unskilled labor if trade results in the importation of advanced technology that 
increases the returns to skilled labor and capital.  For example, Cornia (1999) concludes that 
trade liberalization episodes in Latin America reduced the intensity of unskilled labor in the 
tradable sector through the adoption of imported, advanced technologies, that have also been 
associated with increased wage inequality in the region. 
Moreover, Ghose (2000) argues that, as a general rule, developing countries’ formal 
manufacturing sectors are typically import-competing.  They have no comparative advantage 
relative to manufacturing sectors in industrial countries and thus it is difficult for them to 
export their products to industrial countries. This means that in developing countries, exports 
of labor-intensive manufactures originate basically in the non-formal sector, at least in initial 
stages. It is possible then that higher trade shares may lower formal industrial employment in 
these countries.  The ILO (2004b) reports that the share of self-employment, as a proxy for 
the measure of the informal sector in most developing countries, has increased in most 
developing regions, except East and South-East Asia, during the last two decades.  Thus, 
export-oriented manufacturing in developing countries is also often associated with low 
wages and poor working conditions, and this too is a matter of concern.     12
For estimates using decade averages, tariffs have no significant effect on industrial 
employment growth.  However, estimates using five-year averages (not reported) indicate that 
tariffs increase industrial employment growth for all countries.  Estimates for both decade and 
five-year averages indicate that export taxes increase industrial employment growth in 
developing countries.  Furthermore, both decade averages and five-year averages indicate that 
higher taxes on international trade lead to higher industrial employment growth, especially for 
developed countries. In the estimates, neither BPA nor CURRENT has a significant impact on 
industrial employment growth. Thus, these results are mostly consistent with case studies of 
the employment effects of trade liberalization in developing countries. 
To test the sensitivity of our results to country fixed effects, we also estimate the fixed 
effects specifications (not reported)
7.  There are important differences between the fixed effect 
and SUR estimates.  For the fixed effects estimates, neither trade volumes nor trade barriers 
have any statistically significant effect on industrial employment in developing countries.  
BPA is the only exception, which affects employment growth positively in developing 
countries. Our results, however, indicate that trade volumes, especially trade with other 
industrial countries, do have significant, positive effects on industrial employment growth for 
developed countries.  Note that manufactured imports, export duties, and bilateral payments 
arrangements have significant, negative effects on employment growth in developed 
countries.  
4.2.2  Trade openness and employment in agriculture 
Table 6 reports the SUR estimates for agricultural employment growth.  As expected, 
statistically significant, negative coefficients for trade shares (current and lagged) in the first 
row indicate that countries with higher trade shares are likely to experience reduced 
agricultural employment growth. There are also similar patterns for import and export shares. 
Statistically significant, negative coefficients for trade with OECD countries indicate 
that trading with industrial countries lowers agriculture employment growth in developing 
countries.  This result is consistent with the fact that while on average trade protection has 
declined substantially over the past three decades, it remains significant in both industrial and 
developing countries, particularly for agriculture and labor-intensive industrial products 
where developing countries have a comparative advantage (IMF and World Bank 2001; 
Hertel and Martin 2000).  However, countries trading more with non-OECD countries have 
higher agriculture employment growth.   
                                                 
7 Fixed effects estimates for three sectors are available from the author.   13
While agricultural employment growth in developing countries decreases with higher 
merchandise exports, a similar negative impact is found for manufactured exports on 
agricultural employment growth in developed countries.  For developed countries, higher 
commodity exports as well as agricultural exports raise agricultural employment growth, 
commodity imports do not have any significant impact on agriculture employment growth.  
Overall these results thus do not support the argument that goods embodying more labor 
content have adverse employment effects in the labor markets of industrial countries.  
As expectedly, while the tariffs have a negative impact on agricultural employment 
growth in developing countries, this measure has a positive impact on agricultural 
employment growth in developed countries. These results are consistent with the common 
perception that while developed countries provide relatively more protection to their 
agriculture sectors, developing countries protect their industrial sectors.  Export taxes do have 
a negative, but insignificant, impact on agricultural employment growth.  TAXTRD, BPA and 
CURRENT have positive effects on agriculture employment growth, especially when five-
year averages of growth rates are used. 
Fixed effects estimates (not reported) indicate that none of the current measures of 
trade volumes have any significant effect on agricultural employment growth.  However, 
lagged values of exports, primarily through merchandise exports, have significantly negative 
effects on employment growth for all countries.  The estimates indicate that higher levels of 
trade with industrial countries have significant, negative impacts on employment growth in 
the developing countries. Finally, while BPA raises it, CURRENT lowers agricultural 
employment in developed countries.   
4.2.3  Trade openness and employment in services 
Table 7 reports the estimates for service employment growth.  While decade averages 
show that overall trade shares in GDP have no impact on employment growth in services, 
five-year averages of growth rates indicate that as expected, countries importing more from 
other countries have higher employment growth in services.  Note that for both decade and 
five-year averages, statistically insignificant coefficients for merchandise and manufacturing 
trade suggest that these results are mostly driven by trade in services.  Our results also 
indicate that industrial countries that trade more (with OECD, non-OECD, and the United 
States) have higher employment growth in services.  
Although our measures of trade barriers are mainly related to merchandise trade, trade 
barriers in the form of tariffs, export taxes, and taxes on international trade have a positive 
association with the employment growth in services.  These results are especially pronounced   14
for developing countries.  For both decade and five-year averages, the statistically significant 
and positive coefficients indicate that countries with higher tariffs have higher employment 
growth in services.  Finally, neither BPA nor CURRENT has any significant relationships 
with employment in services, except for lagged values of CURRENT. 
Fixed effects estimates for the employment growth in services show that similar to the 
previous two sectors, most coefficients of current values are insignificant, except those for 
service trade.  For lagged values, employment growth in services in developing countries 
decreases with higher merchandise imports.  For trade restrictions, while XTAX and 
CURRENT raise employment growth in services in the developing countries, BPA lowers it 
in developed countries.  
5. Discussion 
Despite the existence of substantial theoretical evidence (see, Ocampo and Taylor 
1998), opening to trade by itself has not yet been unambiguously and universally linked to 
subsequent output growth in developing countries (see, Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001 and 
Yanikkaya, 2003).  Comparing the growth performances of Latin American countries, which 
are the champions of the Washington style reformers
8, with those of East Asian countries and 
certain other countries that have extensively and selectively intervened to promote overall 
development and in some cases the development of specific industries, renders the issue more 
complex.  On the one hand, Ocampo (2002, p. 394) citing the studies analyzing Latin 
America, concludes that “growth and productivity performance have been frustrating in Latin 
America.”  On the other hand, the longest-lasting episodes of rapid growth in the development 
world (e.g., the East Asian countries, most recently, the Chinese, Indian, and Mauritanian 
‘miracles’, or in the past, the periods of rapid growth in Brazil or Mexico) did not coincide 
with phases of extensive liberalization or with the mere implementation of the Washington 
Consensus style of trade liberalism.  
To the contrary, the idea that countries dismantle trade barriers as they get richer is a 
widely shared view. For example, after comparing the experiences of Vietnam and Haiti 
during the past two decades and the experiences of East Asian countries, China and India, 
Rodrik (2001, p. 22) concludes that “integration with the world economy is an outcome, not a 
prerequisite, of a successful growth strategy.” Milward and Brennan (1996) come to a similar 
                                                 
8 See, Williamson (1990 and 2004) for a complete discussion of the Washington Consensus.   15
conclusion that trade liberalization follows, rather than causes, the great surge in international 
trade in the first half of the 1950s. The World Bank (1993) also shares this view, in part
9.   
Our estimation results indicate that trade openness has not been successful in 
generating jobs in developing countries, either. Conversely, while lagged trade volumes have 
negative employment effects, trade barriers have positive employment effects for the 
industrial sectors of all countries.  For the developing countries, the overall weak, negative 
employment response to trade volumes may be explained by the negative output response to 
trade in these countries
10.  
Empirical evidence to date thus shows that trade liberalization is not a reliable 
mechanism for generating self-sustaining output growth, employment growth, and poverty 
reduction.  It is probably due to the fact that the current international trading regime is missing 
the “developmental view” or more broadly the “human face”.  Therefore, existing trading 
rules that overemphasize trade at the expense of not only poverty reduction but also output 
and employment growth have important consequences for developing countries. 
According to the WTO charter, the highest priority of the WTO is raising standards of 
living, ensuring full employment, and promoting sustainable development.  Several authors 
(Stiglitz 1998, Helleiner 2000, Rodrik 2001, UNCTAD 2004) argue that since expanding 
trade is considered to be the means of achieving these objectives, international trade rules 
have to be formulated according to this view.  The negotiators in the WTO rounds should take 
a more developmental approach and ask, “How should we formulate the international trading 
regime to grow countries out of poverty or to create more jobs?”  
On the one hand, the growth literature and the theory of strategic trade policy, the 
infant-industry arguments, development economics and a large number of case studies and/or 
studies analyzing a limited number of countries all suggest that countries with selective 
interventions, or heterodox trade and industrial policies, perform better than other countries. 
The existing literature comes to a general consensus that trade policies in East Asian countries 
are not those of a laissez-faire regime even though there is disagreement about the effects of 
these policies (Stiglitz 1998; Amsden 1989, Wade 1990; World Bank 1993).  Other studies 
(e.g. Rodrik 2001) emphasized the vital role of unorthodox policies in the outstanding growth 
                                                 
9 The idea that trade may follow growth is similar to so called the Lipset hypothesis (Lipset, 1959), where 
democracy follows prosperity, rather than causes it. 
10 A number of studies (Jacobson et al., 1993a, b, Levinsohn 1999, Matusz and Tarr 1999, Rama 2003, Winters 
2000, World Bank 1997) discuss the fact that the weak employment effects of trade liberalization may mask 
substantial job churning in developing countries, which imposes substantial private costs for replacing workers 
because the longevity of unemployment or underemployment and the identity of the replaced workers are the 
most important adjustment problems occurring in labor markets.    16
performance of countries such as China, India, Vietnam, and Mauritius.  Furthermore, 
Subramanian and Roy (2001) conclude that there are considerable similarities between the 
trade and development strategies of Mauritius and the East Asian countries.  Both 
Subramanian and Roy (2001) and Hinkle et al., (2003) argued that Mauritius was highly 
protected even in the late 1990s.  Latin American countries with miserable growth rates, 
however, have long been known to be followers of Washington Consensus style of trade 
liberalization.  
Although less well known compared to the interventions used in East Asian 
economies, Milward and Brennan (1996) argue that import controls were far more effective in 
attaining the intended objectives including reducing the import bill and providing infant 
industry protection for certain industries.  Milward and Brennan (1996) analyze the use of 
quantitative import controls in the post-war British economy.  The issuance of about a quarter 
of a million separate import control licenses in 1948 evidenced their extensive use in British 
economy.  The extensive use of import controls was also very common in other European 
countries.  They (1996, p. 190) claim that “(M)uch of the modern science-based industry of 
the United Kingdom can be said to owe its birth to such protectionism.”  They also conclude 
that while their effects on raising manufacturing employment were limited, import restrictions 
had a relatively higher impact on regional employment in the UK. 
On the other hand, a large number of studies, mostly case studies briefly cited in 
section 2, report very diverse employment effects of trade liberalization implemented in 
different developing countries.  Combining the employment literature with the literature 
described in the previous paragraphs indicates that the same set of policies that helped 
countries to grow faster also benefited these countries through higher employment levels.  For 
example, Milner and Wright (1998) analyze the case of Mauritius and find that, after a time 
lag, trade liberalization resulted in expanded labor demand in export industries. More 
surprisingly, labor demand appears to increase even in import-competing industries.  Ghose 
(2000) concludes that trade liberalization accelerated manufacturing employment growth in 
both export-oriented and import-competing sectors for East Asian countries (including China 
and India).  Many case studies described above, however, report non-positive, in some cases 
significantly negative, employment effects of trade liberalization for Latin American 
countries.   
Moreover, comparing Zambia and Zimbabwe, Winters (2000) argues that Zambia 
undertook bold, orthodox, and unidirectional trade reform but Zimbabwe was hesitant and 
rather opaque. Yet, based on the outcomes, it appears that Zimbabweans have achieved   17
greater liberalization, especially an increase in competition in the cotton market.  Although, 
following trade reform in both countries, some reallocations occurred, in Zambia following 
the trade liberalization, there was a 15% decline in manufacturing employment in 1991.  The 
liberalization also caused a reduction in output in most manufacturing sectors in Zambia. The 
obvious conclusion is that these results demonstrate that, even though characterized 
differently by different authors, selective intervention, active government policies, or 
heterodox policies seem to work better than the international trading regime currently 
imposed by a few of the developed countries.  Thus, it is probably safe to conclude that both 
higher (or lower) output and employment growth rates can stem from trade and industrial 
policies implemented by these countries.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the question of how trade openness affects the growth rate of 
employment in developed and developing countries.  The estimated results imply that trade 
openness in the form of higher trade volumes has not been successful in generating jobs in 
developing countries. Overall, our results thus imply that most of the developing countries 
have not benefited from trade liberalization, probably due to the absence of strong institutions, 
adequate levels of physical, human, and social capital, sound macroeconomic policies, and a 
competitive economy.  Thus, opening up to trade is not in itself a “panacea” for developing 
countries.  Our estimates also indicate that trade openness, especially measured by trade 
volumes, has an adverse effect on industrial and agricultural employment in developed 
economies.  Moreover, trade barriers have relatively little adverse effect and/or in some cases 
a positive effect on employment both in developing and developed countries. 
Although it is impossible to deny the positive potential effect of international trade in 
overall economic development and poverty reduction, one should be aware that the task 
before all of us is not to maximize trade flows but to maximize the welfare of the people we 
work for.  Furthermore, it isn’t at all obvious that increasing trade is currently in every 
country’s interest (Helleiner 2000; Rodrik 2001; Ocampo 2002). 
In more general terms, active government policies can be a solution to our 
unemployment problem, but at the same time, for countries to benefits from protectionist 
policies they must have the necessary institutional capacity to deal with the rent seeking, 
corruption and inefficiency issues which are probable outcomes of a high degree of selective 
interventionism.   18
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Figure 1: Employment growth and trade shares in GDP 
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Variables GEMPAGRGEMPIND GEMPSER TARIFF XTAX TAXTRD BPA CURRENT
GEMPAGR 1.00 -0.13* -0.23* 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.20*
GEMPIND -0.13* 1.00 0.28* 0.35* 0.25* 0.35* 0.04 0.20*
GEMPSER -0.23* 0.28* 1.00 0.37* 0.16* 0.29* -0.05 0.15*
TRADE -0.22* -0.08 -0.05 -0.07 -0.23* 0.11* -0.27* -0.25*
XGDP -0.23* -0.10 -0.08 -0.14* -0.27* -0.03 -0.28* -0.30*
MGDP -0.18* -0.05 -0.009 0.004 -0.17* 0.23* 0.23* 0.18*
TOECD -0.27* 0.09 -0.02 -0.20* -0.21* 0.11* -0.21* -0.24*
TNOECD -0.12* -0.03 0.002 -0.16* -0.14* 0.10 -0.10 -0.17*
USBTRD -0.09 0.12 0.12 -0.10 -0.009 -0.003 0.06 0.10
MERTRD -0.15* -0.22* -0.03 -0.18* -0.24* 0.02 -0.18* -0.24*
MEREXP -0.13* -0.16* -0.05 -0.27* -0.25* -0.15* -0.22* -0.28*
MERIMP -0.12* -0.16* -0.03 -0.07 -0.22* 0.16* -0.22* -0.24*
MANEXP -0.17* -0.28* -0.28* -0.46* -0.35* -0.45* -0.03 -0.18*
MANIMP 0.02 -0.11 -0.10 -0.16* -0.13 -0.31* -0.14* -0.17*
CMDEXP 0.18* 0.28* 0.22* 0.47* 0.35* 0.46* 0.08 0.16*
CMDIMP -0.04 0.08 0.09 0.16* 0.14 0.30* 0.14* 0.16*
SERVEXP -0.31* -0.03 -0.06 0.07 -0.20* 0.17* -0.20* -0.14*
SERVIMP -0.22* 0.13 0.10 0.18* -0.006 0.24* -0.16* 0.02
See Section 3 and Appendix B for the definition of the variables.
* Statistically significant at least at the 5 % level.    
Table 1: Pearson correlation coefficients for various openness indicators and employment growth
 















Independent Variables SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR
GDP (in constant 1995 USD, in logs) -0.025 -0.30 0.08 0.007 0.19 0.34
(0.08) (0.97) (0.28) (0.02) (0.53) (0.90)
Growth of output per worker in the sector -0.50*** -0.49*** -0.61*** -0.62*** -0.43*** -0.41***
(10.37) (10.50) (7.97) (7.50) (7.48) (7.54)
Urban population growth 0.47*** 0.50*** -0.46 -0.31 0.26 0.31*
(2.95) (3.39) (1.36) (0.93) (1.35) (1.71)
Growth of gross fixed capital formation 0.012 0.008 0.07*** 0.23** 0.0008 0.0001
(0.54) (0.28) (3.65) (2.15) (0.03) (0.001)
Population density (in logs) 0.23 0.22 -0.20 -0.30* 0.51 0.47**
(1.48) (1.50) (1.48) (1.95) (2.41) (2.27)
Import Duties 0.053 0.12 -0.008
(1.42) (1.17) (0.18)
Trade shares in GDP (%) -0.008 0.009 0.009
(1.26) (1.17) (0.89)
R
2, for each equation .57, .51 .56, .47 .94, -1.31 .88, -.72 .42, .47 .35, .44
Number of observations 133 148 46 49 87 99
Table 2: Employment in industry, trade, and trade policies, 1980-1999:Base regression
All countries Developed countries Developing countries
The system has 2 equations, where the dependent variables are the annual average percentage growth rate 
of employment in industry over each decade. Each equation has a different constant term (not reported). 
Other coefficients are restricted to be the same  for all periods.  t-statistics are in parentheses. *** 
Significant at the 1 percent-level. ** Significant at the 5 percent-level. * Significant at the 10 percent-level.
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Independent Variables SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR
GDP (in constant 1995 USD, in logs) 0.51** 0.40* -0.023 0.012 0.64** 0.70*
(2.37) (1.63) (0.20) (0.06) (2.08) (1.92)
Growth of output per worker in the sector -0.50*** -0.62*** -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.52*** -0.65***
(9.42) (12.43) (6.84) (5.49) (2.08) (10.89)
Urban population growth 0.35*** 0.42*** 0.74*** 0.81*** 0.44*** 0.37***
(3.11) (3.68) (7.92) (6.47) (2.77) (2.42)
Growth of gross fixed capital formation 0.022 0.056** 0.004 0.059 0.028 0.042
(1.33) (2.33) (0.42) (1.20) (1.08) (1.49)
Population density (in logs) 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.005 0.25 0.20
(1.06) (0.94) (1.19) (0.07) (1.50) (1.13)
Import Duties 0.083*** 0.086** 0.081**
(3.17) (2.15) (2.41)
Trade shares in GDP (%) 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.51) (1.07) (0.41)
R
2, for each equation .08, .67 -.15, .73 .91, .56 .84, .55 -.09, .71 -.40, .75
Number of observations 133 147 46 49 87 98
Table 3: Employment in services sector, trade, and trade policies, 1980-1999: Base regression
All countries Developed countriesDeveloping countries







Independent Variables SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR
GDP (in constant 1995 USD, in logs) -0.39 0.094 2.01 0.053 0.48 1.79**
(0.58) (0.16) (1.80) (0.09) (0.55) (2.24)
Growth of output per worker in the sect -0.61*** -0.65*** -0.55*** -0.56*** -0.57*** -0.67***
(14.56) (15.60) (7.66) (7.87) (12.47) (13.74)
Rural population growth 0.44** 0.11** 0.28 0.092** 0.63*** 0.72***
(2.19) (2.26) (1.06) (2.10) (2.42) (3.11)
Growth of agricultural machinery, 
tractors -0.36 -1.08*** -2.65* 0.18 -0.17 -1.19**
    per 100 hectares of arable land (0.56) (2.39) (1.97) (0.31) (0.29) (2.14)
Population density (in logs) -0.33* -0.49*** -0.23 -0.45** -0.54** -0.66***
(1.81) (2.89) (1.17) (2.35) (2.33) (3.25)
Import Duties 0.013 0.18 -0.11**
(0.32) (1.65) (2.19)
Trade shares in GDP (%) -0.017** 0.016 -0.008
(2.11) (1.32) (0.74)
R
2, for each equation .63, .73 .61, .76 .66, .71 .64, .76 .68, .70 .66, .75
Number of observations 135 150 44 46 91 104
Table 4: Employment in agriculture, trade, and trade policies, 1980-1999: Base regression
All countries Developed countries Developing countries
Note: See, Table 2.
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All Developed Developing All Developed Developing
countries countries countries countries countries countries
Variable SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR
OPEN -0.008 0.009 0.009 -0.025*** 0.003 -0.010
(1.26) (1.17) (0.89) (3.45) (0.34) (0.92)
MGDP -0.017 0.020 0.010 -0.039*** 0.018 -0.017
(1.33) (1.41) (0.58) (3.45) (0.92) (0.91)
XGDP -0.013 0.013 0.020 -0.041*** -0.003 -0.013
(1.06) (0.89) (1.05) (3.02) (0.17) (0.68)
TOECD -0.008 0.019* 0.032* -0.011 0.028** 0.002
(0.07) (1.94) (1.81) (0.92) (2.25) (0.10)
TNOECD -0.0002 -0.005 0.059* -0.028 -0.038 -0.042
(0.01) (0.36) (1.80) (1.38) (1.68) (0.95)
USBTRD 0.009* 0.005 0.011 0.003 -0.001 0.005
(1.83) (0.91) (1.56) (0.56) (0.24) (0.55)
MERTRD -0.005* -0.0001 0.005 -0.010*** -0.005 -0.006
(1.91) (0.06) (0.73) (2.85) (1.38) (0.88)
MEREXP -0.007 0.0002 0.017 -0.016** -0.009 -0.007
(1.50) (0.07) (1.42) (2.28) (1.43) (0.57)
MERIMP -0.010** 0.0002 -0.002 -0.020*** -0.009 -0.009
(2.20 (0.05) (0.01) (2.98) (1.30) (0.86)
MANEXP -0.036*** 0.014 -0.038** -0.041*** 0.007 -0.025
(2.64) (0.97) (2.08) (3.64) (0.50) (1.63)
MANIMP -0.005 -0.020 0.034 0.002 -0.021 0.044*
(0.20) (0.89) (1.03) (0.10) (1.02) (1.69)
TARIFF 0.053 0.12 -0.008 0.029 0.019 -0.011
(1.42) (1.17) (0.18) (0.91) (0.32) (0.28)
XTAX 0.041 -4.28 0.010 0.16*** -0.44 0.14***
(0.66) (1.57) (0.16) (3.39) (0.56) (2.52)
TAXTRD 0.035 0.18*** -0.008 0.028** 0.084 0.033
(1.49) (2.67) (0.30) (2.25) (1.54) (1.19)
BPA 0.37 -0.17 -0.42 0.12 -0.22 -0.44
(0.55) (0.14) (0.55) (0.24) (0.31) (0.75)
CURRENT 0.45 -1.24 -0.03 0.31 -1.05* 0.06
(0.82) (1.47) (0.05) (0.67) (1.77) (0.10)
Table 5: Employment in industry, trade, and trade policies:two-decade averages, 1980-1999
Contemporaneous Values Five-year lagged values
The system has 2 equations, where the dependent variables are the annual average percentage growth rate of 
employment in industry over each decade. Other regressors are log of GDP at constant US Dollars, log of 
growth of output per worker in the sector, urban population growth, log population densities, growth of gross 
domestic fixed investment.  Each equation has a different constant term (not reported). Other coefficients are 
restricted to be the same  for all periods.  t-statistics are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent-level.   
** Significant at the 5 percent-level. * Significant at the 10 percent-level.    28
All  Developed Developing All  Developed Developing
countries countries countries countries countries countries
Variable SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR
OPEN -0.017** 0.016 -0.008 -0.027*** 0.016 -0.012
(2.11) (1.32) (0.74) (3.04) (1.17) (1.02)
MGDP -0.025 0.041 -0.003 -0.043*** 0.039 -0.006
(1.55) (1.57) (0.17) (2.48) (1.39) (0.27)
XGDP -0.037*** 0.025 -0.023 -0.053*** 0.025 -0.032
(2.44) (1.08) (1.20) (3.22) (0.92) (1.56)
TOECD -0.045*** 0.008 -0.036** -0.040*** 0.010 -0.011
(3.63) (0.54) (2.01) (2.93) (0.50) (0.63)
TNOECD 0.061** 0.038 0.040 -0.039 0.056 -0.053
(2.33) (0.51) (1.31) (1.04) (0.30) (1.36)
USBTRD 0.007 0.022 -0.003 0.0052 0.022 -0.006
(0.89) (1.13) (0.41) (0.55) (1.06) (0.60)
MERTRD -0.010** 0.007 -0.007 -0.016*** 0.006 -0.012*
(2.20) (1.32) (1.15) (3.20) (0.95) (1.73)
MEREXP -0.019** 0.008 -0.018 -0.028*** 0.005 -0.025*
(2.19) (0.90) (1.43) (2.96) (0.47) (1.95)
MERIMP -0.015* 0.018 -0.006 -0.024*** 0.017 -0.011
(1.85) (1.62) (0.60) (2.73) (1.36) (0.97)
MANEXP -0.036*** -0.053*** 0.018 -0.050*** -0.060*** 0.004
(2.41) (4.03) (0.89) (3.72) (4.82) (0.20)
MANIMP -0.060* -0.005 -0.035 -0.010 0.013 -0.014
(1.82) (0.15) (0.86) (0.37) (0.43) (0.40)
CMDEXP 0.035*** 0.053*** -0.017 0.051*** 0.060*** -0.0016
(2.39) (3.92) (0.89) (3.75) (4.64) (0.08)
CMDIMP 0.064* 0.006 0.045 0.007 -0.018 0.020
(1.96) (0.18) (1.11) (0.24) (0.59) (0.55)
AGREXP -0.0003 0.048*** -0.013 0.007 0.047*** -0.008
(0.02) (2.87) (0.87) (0.58) (2.81) (0.66)
AGRIMP 0.050 0.018 0.024 0.11** -0.031 0.14***
(0.90) (0.21) (0.37) (2.37) (0.44) (2.80)
TARIFF 0.013 0.18 -0.11** 0.073*** 0.076 -0.012
(0.32) (1.65) (2.19) (2.28) (1.03) (0.31)
XTAX -0.097 -5.14 -0.078 0.043 -1.11 -0.001
(1.16) (1.26) (0.88) (0.76) (0.98) (0.02)
TAXTRD 0.020 0.12 -0.019 0.036 0.098 0.005
(0.64) (1.40) (0.55) (1.44) (1.57) (0.17)
BPA 2.40*** -2.23 1.33 1.18* -0.77 0.14
(3.04) (1.44) (1.41) (1.85) (0.82) (0.18)
CURRENT 1.09* 0.43 -0.55 1.52*** -0.68 0.77
(1.75) (0.40) (0.73) (2.60) (0.84) (0.98)
Contemporaneous Values Five-year lagged values
Table 6: Employment in agriculture, trade, and trade policies: two-decade averages,1980-1999
Note: See, Table 5.    29
Table 7: Employment in services, trade, and trade policies: two-decade averages,1980-1999
All Developed Developing All Developed Developing
countries countries countries countries countries countries
Variable SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR
OPEN 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.0008 0.002 0.008
(0.51) (1.07) (0.41) (1.04) (0.32) (0.73)
MGDP 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.0007 0.013
(0.36) (1.18) (0.33) (0.02) (0.07) (0.68)
XGDP 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.012
(0.61) (0.92) (0.43) (0.21) (0.54) (0.64)
TOECD -0.006 0.0004 0.011 -0.009 0.0007 0.0008
(0.06) (0.07) (0.74) (0.93) (0.10) (0.05)
TNOECD -0.001 0.018*** -0.007 -0.018 0.024*** -0.036
(0.09) (3.30) (0.28 (1.11) (2.58 (0.96)
USBTRD 0.03 0.007*** 0.004 -0.002 0.007*** -0.007
(0.91) (2.57) (0.71) (0.63) (2.84) (0.86)
MERTRD -0.0008 0.001* 0.0006 -0.002 0.0008 -0.0016
(0.43) (1.72) (0.11) (0.51) (0.55) (0.25)
MEREXP -0.002 0 . 0 0 3- 0 . 0 0 1- 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 0 1- 0 . 0 0 5
(0.63) (1.52) (0.13) (0.64) (0.34) (0.44)
MERIMP -0.0007 0.003* -0.0006 -0.002 0.002 -0.002
(0.20) (1.91) (0.07) (0.38) (0.77) (0.15)
MANEXP 0.005 -0.004 0.006 0.008 -0.004 0.022
(0.48) (0.67) (0.40) (0.87) (0.58) (1.62)
MANIMP 0.003 0.002 0.025 -0.010 -0.001 -0.0002
(0.15) (0.18) (0.84) (0.62) (0.11) (0.01)
SERVEXP 0.044** 0.006 0.052* 0.046* 0.018 0.043
(2.09) (0.32) (1.88) (1.80) (0.84) (1.27)
SERVIMP 0.008 0.004 0.048* 0.014 -0.011 0.042
(0.43) (0.16) (1.90) (0.58) (0.45) (1.38)
TARIFF 0.084*** 0.086** 0.081** 0.081*** 0.052** 0.069***
(3.17) (2.15) (2.41) (3.37) (2.10) (2.17)
XTAX 0.011 0.31 0.050 0.13*** 0.06 0.13***
(0.23) (0.24) (0.88) (3.32) (0.09) (2.82)
TAXTRD 0.021 0.062* 0.024 0.062*** 0.046* 0.031***
(1.22) (1.81) (1.06) (3.74) (1.99) (3.75)
BPA 0.35 0.26 0.076 0.36 -0.14 -0.10
(0.64) (0.45) (0.11) (0.84) (0.40) (0.19)
CURRENT 0.58 0.16 0.12 1.05*** 0.17 0.43
(1.35) (0.36) (0.21) (2.64) (0.53) (0.71)
Contemporaneous Values Five-year lagged values
Note: See, Table 5.
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Appendix A 
Data Summary Statistics 
 All  Developed  Developing 
Variables Countries Countries Countries 
Growth of gross domestic fixed investment (% of GDP)  5.12  4.71  5.29 
Population density (log)  1.62  1.87  1.55 
Employment growth in industry (%)  1.67  -0.61  2.77 
Growth of output per worker in industry (%)  1.04  2.29  0.48 
Employment growth in services (%)  3.78  2.41  4.43 
Growth of output per worker in services (%)  0.06  1.28  -0.50 
Employment growth in agriculture (%)  0.62  -2.36  2.06 
Growth of output per worker in agriculture (%)  0.03  0.89  -0.35 
GDP (log, constant 1995 USD)  10.12  11.19  9.80 
Urban population growth  3.54  1.22  4.20 
Rural population growth  0.76  -0.64  1.15 
Growth of agricultural machinery (%)  2.79  2.23  2.94 
Trade shares  (% of GDP)  68.30  72.32  67.15 





The following data are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004: 
Employment growth in industry (GEMPIND) 
Employment growth in agriculture (GEMPAGR) 
Employment growth in services (GEMPSER) 
Growth of output per worker (LABPROD) 
Growth of gross domestic fixed investment (INV)  
Growth of agricultural machinery, tractors per 100 hectares of arable land (INV)  
Population densities (DENSITY) 
Population growth (urban or rural) (POP) 
GDP at constant US dollars (GDP) 
Trade openness (OPEN): the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP 
Import penetration ratios (MGDP): the ratio imports to GDP 
Exports shares in GDP (XGDP): the ratio exports to GDP 
Merchandise trade (MERTRD): the trade in goods as a share of GDP 
Merchandise exports (MEREXP): the exports in goods as a share of GDP 
Merchandise imports (MERIMP): the imports in goods as a share of GDP 
Manufactured exports as a percentage of merchandise exports (MANEXP) 
Manufactured imports as a percentage of merchandise imports (MANINP) 
Manufactures comprise commodities in SITC sections 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic manufactures), 
7 (machinery and transport equipment), and 8 (miscellaneous manufactured goods), 
excluding division 68 (non-ferrous metals).   31
Commodity exports as a percentage of merchandise exports (CMDEXP) 
Commodity imports as a percentage of merchandise imports (CMDIMP) 
Commodity trade includes in SITC sections 0, 1, 4 (food), 2 (agricultural raw materials), 3 
(mineral, fuels), 27, 28, and 68 (ores and metals). 
Agricultural raw material and food exports as a percentage of merchandise exports 
(AGREXP), 
Agricultural raw material and food imports as a percentage of merchandise exports 
(AGRIMP).   
Services exports as a percentage of services in GDP (SERVEXP) 
Services imports as a percentage of services in GDP (SERVIMP 
Import duties (TARIFF): Import duties as a percentage of the value of imports are the sum of 
all levies collected on goods at the point of entry into the country and are used as a measure 
of the average import tariff rate.  
Export taxes (XTAX): Export duties as a percentage of the value of exports are comprised of 
all levies collected on goods at the point of export.   
Taxes on international trade (TAXTRD): taxes on trade as a percentage of current revenues 
include import duties, export duties, profits of export or import monopolies, exchange profits, 
and exchange taxes. 
The following data are from the IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Restrictions. 
Bilateral payments arrangements of IMF members with non-IMF members (BPA): BPA is an 
agreement that determines the general method of settlement of trade balances between two 
countries.   
Current Account Restrictions (CURRENT): restrictions that exist on payments with respect to 
current transactions in the form of quantitative limits or undue delay on other than restrictions 
imposed for security reasons and official action directly affecting the availability or cost of 
exchange.   
The following data are from Easterly and Sewadeh (2002)  
Trade with OECD countries (TOECD)  
Trade with non-OECD countries (TNOECD) 
US bilateral trade (USBTRD): the ratio of each country’s total bilateral trade with the U.S. to its GDP - 
the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics.   32
Appendix C 
 






































































































* Developed countries 
 